JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, VOL 99, FEBRUARY 2019

中国政治家晋升激励与银行风险敞口

作者：Li Wang (East China Normal University)

Lukas Menkhoff（Humboldt University of Berlin）

Michael Schroder（Center for European Economic Research）

Xian Xu（Fudan University）

摘要：本文表明，政治家晋升的压力增加了他们所在地区的银行风险敞口。中国当地政界人士在他们的地区设定了相对于彼此的增长目标。债务融资计划刺激了增长，这些计划主要通过银行贷款提供资金。政绩压力越大，各自的本地银行风险越大。这种影响适用于受当地政客控制的本地银行，并且随着一篮子刺激计划出台，需要本地共同融资增加，这种影响加大。如果政治家在银行董事会担任主席职位，则影响更大。

关键词：银行贷款;银行风险敞口;当地政客;晋升压力

Politicians’ Promotion Incentives and Bank Risk Exposure in China

Li Wang (East China Normal University); Lukas Menkhoff（Humboldt University of Berlin）; Michael Schroder（Center for European Economic Research）; Xian Xu（Fudan University）

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that politicians’ pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance pressure the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds for local banks which are under some control of local politicians, it has increased with the release of stimulus packages requiring local co-financing and it is stronger if politicians hold chairmen positions in bank boards.

Keywords: Bank Lending; Bank Risk Exposure; Local Politicians; Promotion Pressure

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426618302607

翻译：王秭越