Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 54, Issue 1, February 2019

投资者保护和积极投资的长期表现

作者：Pouyan Foroughi (University of New South Wales, Australia),

Namho Kang (Bentley University, USA),

Gideon Ozik (EDHEC Business School, French),

Ronnie Sadka (Boston College, USA)

摘要：本文使用一种基于基金组织特征构建的投资者保护的简易测度，证明了作为积极投资者目标的拥有更好投资者保护结构的公司，其业绩要比作为积极投资者目标的拥有较差投资者保护结构的公司每年高出约10%。这个业绩优势只被提交Schedule 13D的主动目标投资者观测到，对于Schedule 13G的被动投资则不可见，这表明这个效应并不能被更优的目标选择能力所解释。证据表明，投资者保护较好的基金通过降低代理成本、改善公司治理以及与其他大型机构投资者合作，实现了更高的盈利能力和目标估值比率。

Investor Protection and the Long-Run Performance of Activism

Pouyan Foroughi (University of New South Wales, Australia), Namho Kang (Bentley University, USA), Gideon Ozik (EDHEC Business School, French), Ronnie Sadka (Boston College, USA)

ABSTRACT

Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, this paper documents that companies targeted by activists with better investor protection structures outperform those targeted by those with poor investor protection structures by roughly 10% per year. The outperformance is observed only for active targets for which Schedule 13Ds are filed, not for passive Schedule 13G investments, indicating that the effect is not explained by a superior target-selection ability. The evidence suggests that funds with better investor protection achieve increased profitability and valuation ratio of their targets by reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance, and collaborating with other large institutional investors.

原文链接：https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/investor-protection-and-the-longrun-performance-of-activism/3AE1B5D25122FB363FABEB15A72EFD02

翻译：阙江静