THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES ? VOL.31, NO. 1 ? NOVEMBER 2018

世界各地的代理冲突

作者：Erwan Morellec (EPFL and Swiss Finance Institute)

Boris Nikolov (University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

Norman Schürhoff (University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

摘要：我们使用动态融资决策模型衡量对来自14个国家的12652家大型公司的代理冲突成本进行度量。结果显示，在不同的国家和公司，代理冲突很严重并且差异较大。这种差异很大程度上是由以下因素造成的：公司治理结构、所有权集中度以及无形资产和现金规模等公司特征。法律的产生是为了制约管理过度，而不是为了保护典型企业。财富转移和政策扭曲导致的价值损失构成了代理成本，在所有权集中的大陆法系国家，政策扭曲带来的价值损失相对较小。

关键词：资本结构，代理冲突，公司治理，结构估计

Agency Conflicts around the World

Erwan Morellec (EPFL and Swiss Finance Institute), Boris Nikolov (University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute), Norman Schürhoff (University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

ABSTRACT

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to measure agency conflicts for a large panel of 12,652 firms from 14 countries. Our estimates show that agency conflicts are large and vary significantly across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics, including intangibles and cash. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being smaller in civil law countries where ownership is more concentrated.

Keywords: Capital Structure, Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance, Structural Estimation

原文链接：

https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/31/11/4232/4913822?redirectedFrom="fulltext

翻译：吕越