Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Volume 47, February 2018

高管权力与股票价格效率：来自中国的证据

作者：Meifen Qian(School of Management, Zhejiang University, China),

Ping-Wen Sun(Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, China),

Bin Yu(School of Economics and Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University, China)

摘要：运用管理层较高持股比例、CEO二重性以及控股股东较低持股比例作为度量中国A股的管理层权力更高的指标，我们发现，在控制了流动性和投资者关注的变量后，管理层持股比例较高的公司具有较高的股价延迟。此外，国企（SOE）高管持股比例对股价延迟的影响低于非国企高管持股比例，说明国企高管升职激励对于在股价有效性方面的股权激励起到相反的作用。进一步，我们的研究显示，股票价格延迟且具有较高管理层权力的公司，其应计利润质量较低，发布财务报告的时间较长，发生财务不当行为的机会较高，并且与高层管理权力关联的会计质量指标能够解释股票价格延迟，这表明高管权力通过会计质量渠道影响股价效率。最后，我们的研究证据显示，2005年开始的股权分置改革加大了高层管理层持股比例和控股股东持股比例对股价延迟的影响，表明2012年发起的反腐倡廉行动限制了来自高层的财务操纵，但这降低了控股股东监督高层的动机。

关键词：管理权；股价延迟；会计质量；A股；中国

Top managerial power and stock price efficiency: Evidence from China

Meifen Qian(School of Management, Zhejiang University, China), Ping-Wen Sun(International Institute for Financial Studies and RCFMRP, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, China), Bin Yu(School of Economics and Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University, China)

ABSTRACT

Using higher top managerial ownership, occurrence of CEO duality, and lower ownership of the controlling shareholder to proxy for higher top managerial power in China's A-shares, we find firms with higher top managerial power have higher stock price delay after controlling for liquidity and investor attention variables. Moreover, top managerial ownership of SOE firms exhibits a lower influence on stock price delay than top managerial ownership of non-SOE firms, suggesting top managers' promotion incentive in SOE firms has the opposite effect to their equity incentive on stock price efficiency. Furthermore, our findings show that firms with higher top managerial power component of stock price delay exhibit lower quality of accruals, spend more time to release financial reports, and have higher chances of financial misconduct and that accounting quality measures associated with top managerial power significantly explain stock price delay, indicating top managerial power influences stock price efficiency through the accounting quality channel. Finally, our evidence shows that the Split-Share Structure Reform initiated in 2005 increases the influences of both top managerial ownership and ownership of the controlling shareholder on stock price delay and suggests that the anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 restricts financial manipulations from top managers whereas decreases the incentives of the controlling shareholder to monitor top managers.

Keywords: Managerial power; Stock price delay; Accounting quality; A-shares; China

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X17302603#!

翻译：施懿