Review of Finance, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2018

政治关联的代价

作者：Marianne Bertrand (University of Chicago, USA),

Francis Kramarz (CREST-ENSAE and CEPR, France),

Antoinette Schoar (MIT Sloan, NBER, and CEPR, USA),

David Thesmar (MIT Sloan and CEPR, USA)

摘要：使用来自法国的工厂数据，我们记录了那些不被其他利益抵消的公司的政治关联的潜在代价。政治上有关联的CEO们通过提高工作岗位和工厂创造率，以及在选举年降低破坏率（尤其在有政治争议的地区）的方式改变公司的雇佣决策，用以帮助(地区)政客重新当选。没有证据表明，有关联的企业可以从政府资源的优先权中获益，比如补贴或免税。关联的公司在横截面上有较低的盈利，并且当一个有关联的CEO上台时，盈利能力也会下降。

The Cost of Political Connections

Marianne Bertrand (University of Chicago, USA), Francis Kramarz (CREST-ENSAE and CEPR, France), Antoinette Schoar (MIT Sloan, NBER, and CEPR, USA), David Thesmar (MIT Sloan and CEPR, USA)

ABSTRACT

Using plant-level data from France, we document a potential cost of political connections for firms that is not offset by other benefits. Politically connected CEOs alter corporate employment decisions to help (regional) politicians in their re-election efforts by having higher job and plant creation rates, and lower rates of destruction in election years, especially in politically contested areas. There is little evidence that connected firms benefit from preferential access to government resources, such as subsidies or tax exemptions. Connected firms are less profitable in the cross-section and also experience a drop in profitability when a connected CEO comes to power.

原文链接https://academic.oup.com/rof/article-abstract/22/3/849/4924547?redirectedFrom=fulltext

翻译：阙江静