Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Volume 49, June 2018

在隐性和不完全信息下的撤资选择

作者：Qing Ma (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China),

Susheng Wang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China)

摘要：尽管存在的文献主要集中在一家公司决定撤离子公司的原因，但我们从理论上研究了一家公司撤离子公司的最佳途径。实践中，公司会从四种最受欢迎的撤资途径中选择:出售、分立、分拆和管理层收购。在一个无限期的模型中，资产剥离是在前两个阶段完成的，母公司的所有者剥离子公司以获得最大价值。所有者、子公司经理和外部购买者所掌握的关于子公司盈利能力的信息可能是完整的或不完整的(信息的了解)，并且这些信息可能是显性的或隐性的(信息的性质)。我们研究了信息的性质、信息的了解、风险厌恶和未来业绩的贴现是如何决定最优撤资选择的。

Divestment options under tacit and incomplete information

Qing Ma (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China), Susheng Wang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China)

ABSTRACT

While the literature has mainly focused on why a firm decides to divest a subsidiary, we investigate theoretically what the best divestment option is for a firm to divest a subsidiary. The firm chooses among the four most popular divestment options in practice: sell-offs, spin-offs, carve-outs, and management buyouts. In an infinite-period model, where divestiture is completed in the first two periods, the owners of a parent firm divest a subsidiary for the best value. The information possessed by the owners, subsidiary managers and outside buyers about the subsidiary's profitability may be complete or incomplete (the knowledge of information) and this information may be explicit or tacit (the nature of information). We investigate how the nature of information, the knowledge of information, risk aversion and discount on future performance determine the best divestment option.

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X17303815

翻译：阙江静