学校主页 | 中文 | English
 
 
 
 
 
 

【JFE】繁忙的董事与公司业绩:来自兼并的证据

[发布日期]:2018-04-08  [浏览次数]:

Journal of Financial Economics·Volume 128, Issue 1·April 2018

繁忙的董事与公司业绩:来自兼并的证据

作者:Roie Hauser(Fox School of Business, Temple University)

摘要:本文研究了董事任命多个董事会是否会影响公司的产出。为了克服董事会任命的内生性,本文利用了兼并所产生的变化,这种合并行为终止了整个董事会从而影响了那些被终止董事的任命。董事会任命的减少和较高的盈利能力、市值账面比和董事加入董事会委员会的可能性相关。当董事在地理位置上远离公司总部时,绩效收益尤其明显。本文的结论是,兼并冲击对董事会任命的影响是:(1)证明董事会很重要;(2)可以通过工作量渠道进行合理解释;当董事在别处工作时,他们公司会受益。

关键词:董事会,董事会组成,繁忙的董事,公司治理

Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers

Roie Hauser(Fox School of Business, Temple University)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies whether director appointments to multiple boards impact firm outcomes. To overcome endogeneity of board appointments, I exploit variation generated by mergers that terminate entire boards and thus shock the appointments of those terminated directors. Reductions of board appointments are associated with higher profitability, market-to-book, and likelihood of directors joining board committees. The performance gains are particularly stark when directors are geographically far from firm headquarters. I conclude that the effect of the shocks to board appointments is: (i) evidence that boards matter; and (ii) plausibly explained by a workload channel: when directors work less elsewhere, their companies benefit.

Keywords:Board of directors, Board composition, Busy boards, Corporate governance

原文链接:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18300230#!

翻译:何杉



上一条:【JF】卖空风险 下一条:【JF】金融知识与投资组合变化

关闭