Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Volume 48, April 2018, Pages 17–34

退市压力，高管薪酬和公司造假：来自中国的证据

作者：Fangzhao Zhou (Jiangnan University, China), Zenan Zhang (Jiangnan University, China), Jun Yang (Acadia University, Canada), Yunpeng Su (Tianjin University, China), Yunbi An (University of Windsor, Canada)

摘要

本文从退市压力的角度研究了中国上市公司高管薪酬与公司造假之间的关系。考虑到中国股票市场中上市和退市制度的特殊性，我们发现退市压力直接导致了欺诈的发生，尤其是信息披露违规的发生。我们还发现，无论是否存在退市压力，薪酬较低的CEO和CFO都会更易发生欺诈行为。然而，退市压力削弱了高管薪酬与公司造假可能性之间的负相关关系。最后，在考虑股权激励时，CEO的薪酬总额对欺诈的影响取决于退市压力。对没有退市压力的公司来说，CEO的薪酬总额较高会对欺诈行为有一定的抑制作用，然而对于有退市压力的公司来说这种效应就会消失。

Delisting pressure, executive compensation, and corporate fraud: Evidence from China

Fangzhao Zhou (Jiangnan University, China), Zenan Zhang (Jiangnan University, China), Jun Yang (Acadia University, Canada), Yunpeng Su (Tianjin University, China), Yunbi An (University of Windsor, Canada)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and the incidence of corporate fraud in Chinese listed companies from the perspective of delisting pressure. We find that delisting pressure directly contributes to the incidence of fraud, especially the incidence of information disclosure violations, given the unique listing and delisting systems in the Chinese stock market. We also find that CEOs and CFOs with relatively low pay are more likely to commit fraud, regardless of whether or not delisting pressure is present. However, delisting pressure weakens the negative relationship between executive pay and the likelihood of corporate fraud. Finally, when equity incentives are also considered, the effect of CEOs' total compensation on fraud is contingent on delisting pressure. High CEOs' total compensation has a deterring effect on fraud for firms with no delisting pressure, while this effect disappears for firms with delisting pressure.

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X17304316

翻译：阙江静