FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT · Volume 47, Issue 1· 2018

在董事会中强制任命工人代表及其对股东财富的影响

作者：Stefan Petry (University of Manchester in Manchester, United Kingdom)

摘要：一些国家法律上要求公司必须在董事会中任命工人代表。这样的公司治理设计对股东财富的影响模棱两可。我们检验了1976年导致德国劳资协同经营法案（German Codetermination Act）通过的主要的里程碑事件附近的异常公告收益率。发现相比控制组，关于该法案的新闻使得那些明显受到新闻影响的公司的股权市值平均要低1.5%。而接近2000雇员这一监管门槛的公司未被影响，这暗示着避免合规的预期的存在。

Mandatory Worker Representation on the Board and Its Effect on Shareholder Wealth

Stefan Petry (University of Manchester in Manchester, United Kingdom)

ABSTRACT

Several countries legally mandate representation of workers on boards of directors. The evidence on the shareholder wealth effects of such a corporate governance design is mixed. I examine abnormal announcement returns around major milestones leading to the passing of the German Codetermination Act in 1976. I find that news about the act causes an average decline in the equity value of firms that are certain to have been affected by the new law of up to 1.5% relative to the control firms. Firms close to the regulatory threshold of 2,000 employees remain unaffected implying an expectation of avoiding compliance.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12181/full

翻译：吴雨玲