FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT·Volume 46, Issue 4·2017

探究并购中信息不对称和不确定性的双面影响

作者：Mathieu Luypaert (Vlerick Business School, Ghent, Belgium)

Tom Van Caneghem (KU Leuven and Universiteit Antwerpen, Brussels, Belgium)

摘要：我们研究了投标人和被收购公司信息不对称和不确定性对收购价款以及包含上市和非上市目标公司的并购大样本中的财富效应的联合效用。与分担风险的论点一致，我们发现在被收购公司有更大不确定性的收购中更可能用股票结算。相反，更大程度的信息不对称会增加现金支付的可能性，这与投标者策略性地去发掘优质信息一致。当被收购公司更不透明时，收购方能从总收购中获得更多的份额，并且通过支付现金避免将获得的部分与被收购公司的股东分享。

Exploring the Double-Sided Effect of Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Mergers and Acquisitions

Mathieu Luypaert (Vlerick Business School, Ghent, Belgium), Tom Van Caneghem (KU Leuven and Universiteit Antwerpen, Brussels, Belgium)

ABSTRACT

We examine the joint effect of bidder and target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the payment consideration and subsequent wealth effects in a large sample of acquisitions with both listed and private targets. In line with a risk-sharing argument, we find that acquisitions of targets characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock. In contrast, higher target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of a cash payment, consistent with bidders strategically exploiting superior information. Acquirers of more opaque targets obtain a larger fraction of total acquisition gains and avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders by offering cash.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12170/full

翻译：吴雨玲