CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH·Volume 34, Issue 3·Fall 2017

高质量的审计是抑制还是鼓励了对私人信息的收集？

作者：Yangyang Chen (Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Shibley Sadique (Rajshahi University), Bin Srinidhd (University of Texas at Arlington), Madhu Veeraraghavan (T.A. Pai Management Institute)

摘要：金融文献为投资者在定价决策中如何对公开的财务报表的质量做出反应给出了两种相反的可能性解释。投资者要么可能会收集更多的私人信息从而获益于低的信息收集成本；要么由于更低的边际收益，收集更少的私人信息。在这篇文章中，我们使用审计设置来检验哪种解释更有说服力。我们通过将特质回报波动率作为公司层面特有信息的代理变量，证明了在2000年至2010年间8261家美国公司的51559个公司-年的观测样本中，被高质量审计师审计的公司展示出了更低的平均特质回报波动率，但在盈余公告时期呈现出更高的集中度。我们的研究证明了高质量的审计将减少私人信息的收集。在使用其他的审计质量和特质回报波动率测度方法后，该结论依然稳健。

Does High-Quality Auditing Mitigate or Encourage Private Information Collection?

Yangyang Chen (Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Shibley Sadique (Rajshahi University), Bin Srinidhd (University of Texas at Arlington), Madhu Veeraraghavan (T.A. Pai Management Institute)

ABSTRACT

The finance literature offers two competing possibilities on how investors respond to the quality of public financial statements in their pricing decisions. They could collect either (i) more private information to benefit from lower information collection cost, or (ii) less private information because of lower incremental benefits. In this paper, we use the audit setting to examine which possibility prevails. Using the idiosyncratic return volatility as a proxy for firm-specific information, we show in a sample of 51,559 firm-year observations for 8,261 U.S. firms spanning the period of 2000–2010 that firms audited by higher-quality auditors exhibit lower average idiosyncratic return volatility but a higher concentration of it at the time of earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the argument that investors reduce private information collection in response to higher audit quality. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of audit quality and idiosyncratic return volatility.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3846.12318/full

翻译：吴雨玲