Journal of Financial Economics·Volume 127, Issue 1·January 2018

资本利得锁定和治理选择

作者：Stephen G.Dimmock（Nanyang Technological University）

William C.Gerken（University of Kentucky）

ZoranIvkovi?（Michigan State University）

Scott J.Weisbenner（University of Illinois）

摘要：在累积收益和投资者税收敏感性方面的差异会导致共同基金之间的资本利得锁定效应的变化，即使是同一只股票也是如此。对这种变化进行研究，我们发现这种效应会影响基金的治理决策：较高的资本利得会降低基金在争议投票前退出的可能性，并增加基金投票反对管理层的可能性。与税收动机一致，这些影响主要集中在由税收敏感投资者持有的基金中。此外，持有股票的基金总资本利得较高，预示着管理层失去投票的可能性较高，以及争议投票奏效的可能性较低。

关键词：共同基金，代理投票，公司治理，资本利得税，锁定效应

Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Stephen G.Dimmock（Nanyang Technological University）, William C.Gerken（University of Kentucky）, ZoranIvkovi?（Michigan State University）, Scott J.Weisbenner（University of Illinois）

ABSTRACT

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.

Keywords：Mutual fund, Proxy voting, Corporate governance, Capital-gains tax, Lock-in effect

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X17302842#!

翻译：何杉