Journal of Accounting and Economics · Volume: 62 Issue:1 · AUG 2016

董事网络与知情交易者

作者：Ferhat Akbas(School of Business, University of Kansas)

Felix Meschke (School of Business, University of Kansas)

M. Babajide Wintoki(School of Business, University of Kansas)

摘要：我们的研究表明，像卖空者、期权交易者和金融机构这样富有经验的投资者在交易董事会成员之间存在更多关联的公司的股票时，会了解到更多的信息。与具有相同收益差距但董事会成员之间关联程度较低的公司相比，对于拥有大型董事网络的公司来说，知情交易中最高和最低五分位投资组合的年化收益差距从4％增加到7.2％。对于董事会成员之间存在更多关联的公司，富有经验的投资者可以更好地预测即将到来的盈利异常以及公司特定的新闻情绪。董事会联系程度的变化与逆向选择措施的变化正相关。

关键词：董事网络，卖空者，卖空比例，知情交易者，盈余公告

Director networks and informed traders

Ferhat Akbas(School of Business, University of Kansas)Felix Meschke (School of Business, University of Kansas) M. Babajide Wintoki(School of Business, University of Kansas)

ABSTRACT

We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.

Keywords: Director networks, Short sellers, Short interest, Informed traders, Earnings announcements

原文链接：

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410116300039

翻译：张展