Journal of Accounting and Economics · Volume 64 Issue 1 · AUG 2017

大型银行CEO的更换：与尾部风险有关？

作者：Abhishek Srivastav(Leeds University Business School),

Kevin Keasey(Leeds University Business School)

Sabur Mollah(Hull University Business School)

Francesco Vallascas(Leeds University Business School)

摘要：在跨国背景下，本文发现大型银行CEO被迫更换的概率与异质性尾部风险正相关。这一关系在银行业的竞争越大以及利益相关者在财务困境时潜在损失越大时更强。总的来说，异质性尾部风险的暴露为银行董事会提供了一个判断CEO决策的质量水平的有用信号。相比之下，系统性尾部风险则仅在这种风险对股东和银行机构造的成本出现巨大差别的时候才对CEO被迫替换产生很大影响。

关键词：尾部风险，CEO更换，银行管理

CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter?

Abhishek Srivastav(Leeds University Business School), Kevin Keasey(Leeds University Business School),Sabur Mollah(Hull University Business School),Francesco Vallascas(Leeds University Business School)

ABSTRACT

In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for forced CEO turnovers only in the presence of a major variation in the costs this risk generates for shareholders and the organization.

Keywords: Tail risk, CEO turnover, Bank governance

原文链接：

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410117300307

翻译：张展