Financial Management (Wiley-Blackwell). Volume 46, Issue 1 Spring 2017 Pages 129–154

劳工权利，风险投资和公司表现

作者：Xuejing Xing (College of Business at the University of Alabama in Huntsville), John S. Howe (Trulaske College of Business at the University of Missouri in Columbia), Randy I. Anderson (Griffin Capital Asset Management in El Segundo.), Shan Yan (Department of Management at Susquehanna University in Selinsgrove)

摘要：我们研究了劳工组织对风险投资支持的公司表现的影响。运用1983至2013年首次公开发行上市的庞大的公司样本，我们发现在高度工会组织化的行业中风险投资支持的公司拥有更低的托宾Q并且更不易生存。这一效应对于内生性问题和控制行业、公司特征后都是稳健的。这些发现说明强大的工会权利会阻碍创新型公司的表现和生存，因此对创新、经济增长和就业产生负面影响。

Labor Rights, Venture Capital, and Firm Performance

Xuejing Xing (College of Business at the University of Alabama in Huntsville), John S. Howe (Trulaske College of Business at the University of Missouri in Columbia), Randy I. Anderson (Griffin Capital Asset Management in El Segundo.), Shan Yan (Department of Management at Susquehanna University in Selinsgrove)

ABSTRACT：We investigate the role of labor unions in the performance of venture capital (VC)-backed firms. Using a large sample of initial public offering firms from 1983 to 2013, we find that VC-backed firms in highly unionized industries have lower Tobin's Q and are less likely to survive. This effect is robust to endogeneity concerns and to controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The findings suggest that strong labor rights impede innovative firms’ performance and survival, thereby adversely affecting innovation, economic growth, and employment.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12137/epdf

翻译：孙雨琦