Contemporary Accounting Research · Volume 34, Issue 2 · Summer 2017

高管性别不同导致的薪酬差距：女性风险厌恶和董事会代表的作用

作者：Mary Ellen Carter（Carroll School of Management, Boston College）

Francesca Franco（London Business School）

Mireia Gine（IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra, WRDS, The Wharton School）

摘要：利用1996-2010年期间标准普尔1500指数成分股公司的高管人员大样本，我们发现女性和男性高管之间的工资和总薪酬存在显著的差距，并探讨了这个差距的两个可能性解释。我们发现女性更高的风险厌恶程度是其中一个促成因素。女性高管持有显著更低的股权激励，并在承担一定补偿风险水平下要求更高的薪酬溢价。这些结果表明，女性的风险厌恶通过对事前补偿结构的影响，导致了所观察到的较低的薪酬水平。我们也找到了证据表明公司董事会缺乏性别多样性会影响男女高管薪酬差距的大小。在董事会女性董事比例较高的公司中，薪酬差距和总薪酬水平较低。总而言之，这些研究结果表明，女性较高的风险厌恶可能成为全薪收敛的障碍，尽管董事会上性别差异越来越大。

Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation

Mary Ellen Carter（Carroll School of Management, Boston College）, Francesca Franco（London Business School）, Mireia Gine（IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra, WRDS, The Wharton School）

ABSTRACT

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3846.12286/full

翻译：何杉