Review of Financial Studies · VOL30. NO. 7 · July 2017

股权兑现和投资

作者：A Edmans（London Business School, CEPR, and ECGI）

VW Fang（Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota）

K Lewellen（Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth）

摘要：本文将CEO对当前股价的关注与实际投资的减少联系起来。我们用在指定的季度内计划授予的股票和期权数量来衡量短期关注度。在同一季度，股权兑现与研发投入和资本支出增长率的下降、积极的分析师预测修正和正面的收益指导有关。从更广泛的意义上说，通过引入一项由几年前的股权授予决定的激励措施不太可能被当前的投资机会所驱动，我们提供的证据表明，CEO的合同影响了真正的决策。

关键词：投资，短期主义，管理短视，股权兑现，CEO激励

Equity Vesting and Investment

A Edmans（London Business School, CEPR, and ECGI）；VW Fang（Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota）；K Lewellen（Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth）

ABSTRACT

This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. Vesting equity is associated with a decline in the growth of research and development and capital expenditure, positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance, within the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities, we provide evidence that CEO contracts affect real decisions.

Keywords: Investment, Short-Termism, Managerial Myopia, Vesting, CEO Incentives

原文链接：http://xueshu.baidu.com/s?wd=paperuri%3A%28e09505f993b60bde44cbd236240a4acb%29&filter=sc_long_sign&tn=SE_xueshusource_2kduw22v&sc_vurl=http%3A%2F%2Fpapers.ssrn.com%2Fabstract%3D2270027&ie=utf-8&sc_us=16775519333834260293

翻译：黄涛