Critical Finance Review, 2014, 3: 49–83

集中的机构投资者真的能减少高管薪酬并且提高激励吗？

作者：Gavin S. Smith (Macquarie Capital), Peter L. Swan (University of New South Wales)

摘要：Hartzell和Starks（HS）（2003）报告，机构投资者更加集中的公司会支付给高管更少的薪酬，并使工资对业绩更加敏感。把数据延长到1992年至2010年，我们发现当我们以市值的对数而不是HS使用的原始市值来控制企业规模时，集中的机构投资者没有这样的影响。这在长期的时间序列和面板分析中都成立。HS认为，受到监管的公司与不受监管的同行相比，似乎并没有更好地控制高管薪酬以及拥有更好的业绩。总体而言，我们的结果与任何形式的集中的机构投资者产生的监管效应不一致。

关键词：高管薪酬;监测;机构所有权;委托代理;激励;集中的所有权。

Do Concentrated Institutional Investors Really Reduce Executive Compensation Whilst Raising Incentives?

Gavin S. Smith (Macquarie Capital), Peter L. Swan (University of New South Wales)

ABSTRACT

Hartzell and Starks (HS) (2003) report that firms with more concentrated institutional investors pay executives less, and make this pay more sensitive to performance. In an extended data set covering 1992 to 2010, we find that institutional concentration has no such effects when we control for firm size with a logarithmically transformed market-capitalization instead of HS’s raw market-capitalization. This holds both in the long-run time-series and in the panel analysis. Firms that HS consider monitored do not seem to have better control of managerial compensation or performance than their unmonitored counterparts. Our results are, on the whole, inconsistent with any form of concentrated institutional monitoring.

Keywords: Executive compensation; monitoring; institutional ownership; principal-agent; incentives; concentrated ownership.

原文链接：http://cfr.ivo-welch.info/readers/pub/cfr-014.pdf

翻译：任兆月