Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2017, pp. 781-809

应该规定间接经纪人佣金上限吗？来自共同基金市场和分销费用的经验

作者：Natalie Y. Oh (University of New South Wales), Jerry T. Parwada (University of New South Wales), Eric K. M. Tan (University of Otago)

摘要：理论预测，经纪人的佣金上限会加剧对散户的剥削。我们的研究表明，对共同基金12b-1费用（有效的销售佣金）上限的规定与股票基金负业绩有关，但这只在2000年左右朝着最大许可佣金水平转变后才会发生。超过这个突破点后，流业绩敏感性会从中等业绩转为最佳业绩的基金，这表明收费上限通过限制经纪人了解低排名基金的动机来增加绩效追逐行为。政策意义在于，监管机构必须重新评估经纪佣金上限的效力。

Should Indirect Brokerage Fees Be Capped? Lessons from Mutual Fund Marketing and Distribution Expenses

Natalie Y. Oh (University of New South Wales), Jerry T. Parwada (University of New South Wales), Eric K. M. Tan (University of Otago)

ABSTRACT

Theory predicts that capping brokers’ compensation exacerbates the exploitation of retail investors. We show that regulated caps on mutual fund 12b-1 fees, effectively sales commissions, are associated with negative equity fund performance, but only after a structural shift toward maximum permitted levels of the fees around 2000. Past this break point, flow–performance sensitivity shifts from the middle- to the highest-performing funds, suggesting that the fee cap increases performance-chasing behavior by constraining brokers’ incentives to learn about lower-ranked funds. The policy implication is that regulators must reevaluate the efficacy of caps on brokerage fees.

原文链接：

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000060

翻译：陈然