Review of Accounting Studies· Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2016

收入与管理薪酬契约中基于股价的激励

作者：AE Bernardo (UCLA Anderson School of Management), H Cai (Guanghua School of Management), J Luo (Nanyang Technological University)

摘要：我们建立了一个以股票价格为基础的激励机制理论，该理论在股票价格不包含公司未知信息时仍旧成立。在我们的模型中，如果市场对投资某公司的投资机会质量持有不同的意见时，公司经理必须搜寻并决定新的投资项目。当市场有一致的或悲观的信念时，公司最好提供仅基于已实现收入的激励，从而导致有效的投资政策；然而，当市场呈现出乐观信念时，公司最好引进基于股票价格的激励，这会导致一个无效的投资政策。如果公司可以在有利条件下筹集到股权资本，那么公司眼中的负净现值项目很可能在流通股东看来是正的净现值项目。公司将会通过提供基于当前股价的薪酬激励促使公司经理实施这样的项目。

关键词：薪酬，投资政策，错误定价

Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts

AE Bernardo(UCLA Anderson School of Management), H Cai(Guanghua School of Management), J Luo(Nanyang Technological University)

ABSTRACT

We develop a theory of stock-price-based incentives even when the stock price does not contain information unknown to the firm. In our model, a manager must search for and decide on new investment projects when the market may have a difference of opinion about the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities. The firm optimally provides incentives based solely on realized earnings, leading to an efficient investment policy, when the market has congruent or pessimistic beliefs; however, the firm optimally introduces stock-price-based incentives, leading to an inefficient investment policy, when the market has optimistic beliefs. If the firm can raise equity capital on favorable terms, negative NPV projects from the perspective of the firm may be positive NPV projects from the perspective of current shareholders. The firm motivates the manager to take such projects by basing some compensation on the current stock price.

Keywords: Compensation；Investment policy；Mispricing

原文链接：

http://xueshu.baidu.com/s?wd=paperuri%3A%28463abb837caa59268b04e6f9fc403a8d%29&filter=sc_long_sign&tn=SE_xueshusource_2kduw22v&sc_vurl=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs11142-015-9339-6&ie=utf-8&sc_us=16540955551746051525

翻译：黄涛