Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Volume 40, Part B, December 2016, Pages 349–366

那些交易股票的CEO会采取更激进的公司投资策略吗？

作者: Reza Bradrania (University of South Australia), P. Joakim Westerholm (The University of Sydney Business School), James Yeoh (The University of Sydney Business School)

摘要：这篇文章研究了交易股票比较活跃的CEO是否会导致更高水平的公司投资。相比投资于固定收益资产，将全部财富中更高比例分配给股票资产的个人被定义为低风险厌恶。我们发现这种行为特征无论对个人还是对公司都是一致的。在公司层面，有交易者CEO的公司会有更高的资本性支出和更多的并购，在个人层面，那些拥有较高投资额度的CEO会偏向更具冒险性的公司投资策略。这个发现也揭示了股票持有者是如何能够更好地将自己的策略和CEO的偏向性结合起来的。即便考虑到潜在的内生性，例如在选择特定公司的CEO和样本选择偏差等方面，这些结论也都是稳定的。

Do CEOs who trade shares adopt more aggressive corporate investment strategies?

Reza Bradrania (University of South Australia), P. Joakim Westerholm (The University of Sydney Business School), James Yeoh (The University of Sydney Business School)

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether CEOs who have active share trading accounts engage in higher levels of corporate investment. Individuals who allocate a higher proportion of their wealth to equities, as opposed to fixed income assets, are by definition less risk averse. We find that this behavioral attribute is consistent in both the personal and corporate domain. Corporations with trader CEOs have higher capital expenditures and make significantly more acquisitions, and CEOs with higher portfolio turnover engage in riskier forms of corporate investment. The findings shed light on how shareholders can better align CEO preferences with their own. These conclusions are robust to adjustments for potential endogeneity in the choice of CEO for a specific firm and sample selection bias.

原文链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X16300117

翻译：阙江静