REVIEW OF FINANCE · VOL.20, ISSUE.5 · AUGUST 2016

让股东决定高管薪酬！股东声音及公司业绩

作者：Vicente Cu?at (The London School of Economics), Mireia Giné (University of Pennsylvania and IESE Business School), Maria Guadalupe (INSEAD, CEPR and IZA)

摘要：这篇文章估计了由股东决定高管薪酬政策（SoP）的效果，它是一种由向股东定期对高管薪酬投票来增加股东“声音”的政策。我们对股东发起SoP建议的投票采用断点回归设计。采用SoP可以带来市场价值的大幅增长（5％）和长期盈利能力的改善。相反，它对薪酬水平和结构的影响有限。总而言之，我们的研究结果表明，SoP可以看作是一种重复定期对CEO信心的投票，也是一种惩戒方式。

Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Vicente Cu?at (The London School of Economics), Mireia Giné (University of Pennsylvania and IESE Business School), Maria Guadalupe (INSEAD, CEPR and IZA)

ABSTRACT

This article estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP), a policy that increases shareholder “voice” by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (5%) and to improvements in long-term profitability. In contrast, it has limited effects on pay levels and structure. Taken together our results suggest that SoP can be seen as a repeated regular vote of confidence on the CEO and that it serves as a disciplining device.

原文链接：http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/5/1799.abstract

翻译：陈然