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【FM】邻近证券交易委员会与股价崩盘风险

[发布日期]:2016-11-24  [浏览次数]:

Financial Management (Wiley-Blackwell). Summer2016, Vol. 45 Issue 2, p341-367

邻近证券交易委员会与股价崩盘风险

作者:Thomas R. Kubick (University of Kansas), G. Brandon Lockhart (Clemson University)

摘要:我们探究了美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的监管对披露行为的影响,该影响能在某种程度上减少个股价格崩盘的可能性。离证券交易委员会更远的公司有更大的价格崩盘风险,并且当公司的财务报表可读性更低以及证券交易委员会的预算相对更小时,这一结果更为显著。相似的结果也可以从证券交易委员会区域办公地点变化得到,这些办公地点的变化是外生性的。我们的结果显示,SEC的监管致使公司在披露行为中降低了大规模负面披露的可能性。

Proximity to the SEC and Stock Price Crash Risk.

Thomas R. Kubick (University of Kansas), G. Brandon Lockhart (Clemson University)

ABSTRACT:

We explore the possibility that Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight influences disclosure practices in a manner that reduces the likelihood of individual stock price crashes. Firms located farther from the SEC have greater stock price crash risk and this result is more pronounced for firms with financial statements that are less readable (those with larger 10-K filings) and more pronounced when SEC budgets are relatively smaller. Similar results are obtained in response to SEC regional office location changes that are more likely to be exogenous. Our results suggest that SEC oversight induces disclosure practices that reduce the likelihood of large negative disclosures.

原文链接:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12122/pdf

翻译:孙雨琦



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