THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE ·Volume 40, Oct 2016, Pages 24–46

国际机构投资者监督效率背后的驱动力量：来自盈余管理的证据

作者：Incheol Kim (College of Business & Entrepreneurship-The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley), Steve Miller (Haub School of Business-Saint Joseph's University), Hong Wan (School of Business-State University of New York at Oswego), Bin Wang (Craig School of Business-Missouri Western State University)

摘要：本文在一个国际的视野中研究了国际机构投资者监督公司盈余管理效率背后的驱动力量。我们提出了3种不同的驱动力量和2个竞争性的假设：“家乡优势假说”认为，由于和被监控的信息较为临近，当地的机构在识别盈余管理方面，相对于国外的机构具有比较优势；与之相对，“国际投资者假说”认为，国际投资者具有比较优势因为它们有更强烈的行动主义倾向和采用更高级监控技术的能力。与“家乡优势假说”的观点相一致，总体来讲，由当地机构而非外国机构投资者持股，盈余管理相对较少；当距离被监控信息更近时，国外机构投资者的监管效率会提升。与“国际投资者假说”的观点相一致，当有着更大的代理冲突或

者更弱的管理控制或者国内外机构的监控技术差距变大时，国外机构的监督效率会提升。

关键词：机构投资者，盈余管理，公司治理，地理距离

Drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management

Incheol Kim (College of Business & Entrepreneurship-The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley), Steve Miller (Haub School of Business-Saint Joseph's University), Hong Wan (School of Business-State University of New York at Oswego), Bin Wang (Craig School of Business-Missouri Western State University)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in curbing earnings management in an international setting. We identify three distinct drivers and propose two competing hypotheses: the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that because of proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutions have a comparative advantage over foreign institutions in deterring earnings management, whereas the global investor hypothesis predicts that foreign institutions have a comparative advantage because of their proclivity toward activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies. Consistent with the hometown advantage hypothesis, in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management; the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves as they gain proximity to monitoring information. Consistent with the global investor hypothesis, the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves in environments of greater agency conflicts or weaker governance controls or when the gap in monitoring technology between foreign and domestic institutions widens.

Keywords: Institutional investors, Earnings management, Corporate governance, Geographic distance

原文链接：http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0929119916300724/1-s2.0-S0929119916300724-main.pdf?_tid=698ffe6a-7c75-11e6-95ef-00000aab0f27&acdnat=1474075620_21a54525f72edab1657bb37a321fc597

翻译：田佳琪