The Journal of Finance Volume 71, Issue5, October 2016, Pages 2239-3386

解雇成本和资本结构决策

作者：Matthew Serfling (Department of Finance-University of Tennessee)

摘要：本文利用国家层面的劳动保护法的颁发作为一个增加解雇成本的外生事件，用来检验解雇成本是如何影响资本结构决策的。本文发现在颁布了这些法律之后公司降低了债务比率，而且对于那些解雇成本较高的公司这个结果更加明显。除此之外，本文还发现颁布这些法律之后，一个公司的营业杠杆系数增加了，收益变动率也增加了，并且雇佣变得更加严格。总之，这个结果和较高的解雇成本通过增加的财务困境成本来挤出财务杠杆的结论是一致的。

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

Matthew Serfling (Department of Finance-University of Tennessee)

ABSTRACT

I exploit the adoption of state-level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs

原文链接： http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.12403/full

翻译：阙江静