Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2018

组织形态与公司股利支付政策

作者：Bradford D. Jordan (University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics)

Mark H. Liu (University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics)

Qun Wu（University of Nevada–Reno College of Business Administration）

摘要：我们检验了组织形态如何影响公司的支付政策。综合企业比单一业务企业支付了更多的现金股利和总体股利支付（现金股利加上股票回购）。并且，相对于单一业务公司，综合企业的股利支付对现金流更敏感。股利政策对现金流的敏感性随着综合企业不同业务相关性的降低而提高。公司的股利支付在M&A之后会上升，尤其是在受到业务相关性较低的企业并购之后。该结果表明一个综合企业不同部门间的共同保险效应让他们能相对单一业务公司给股东支付更多的现金流。

Organizational Form and Corporate Payout Policy

Bradford D. Jordan (University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics)

Mark H. Liu (University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics)

Qun Wu（University of Nevada–Reno College of Business Administration）

ABSTRACT

We examine how organizational form affects corporate payouts. Conglomerates pay out more than pure plays in both cash dividends and total payouts (cash dividends plus share repurchases). Furthermore, their payouts are more sensitive to cash flows compared to pure-play firms. The sensitivity of payouts to cash flow increases as the cross-segment correlation in a conglomerate decreases. Corporate payouts increase after mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially among M&As in which acquirers and targets are less correlated. These results suggest that the coinsurance among different divisions of a conglomerate allows them to pay out more cash flow to their shareholders than pure-play firms.

原文链接: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/organizational-form-and-corporate-payout-policy/C24417710DB8F12CB799B4FF806A0072

翻译：汪国颂