JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 50，JUNE 2018
董事会独立性、腐败和创新：英国子公司的一些证据
作者：Vania Sena (University of Essex)
Meryem Duygun (University of Nottingham)
Giuseppe Lubrano (University of Salerno)
Marianna Marra (University of Essex)
Mohamed Shaban (University of Sheffield)
摘要：本文验证了独立董事会可以使公司免受腐败对其业绩的不利影响（由创新代理）的假设。为了验证这个假说，我们提出一个创新生产函数，将创新产出与创新投入（即研发投资）联系起来，并以由英国跨国公司控制的，位于30个国家的制造业子公司作为样本进行研究。我们的分析涵盖了2005-2013年。在控制了子公司的特征（包括所有权结构以及主要股东是否来自普通法国家）之后，我们发现独立董事会可以减轻腐败对创新的负面影响，因为位于更腐败国家和更多独立董事会的子公司更加倾向于投资研发并注册更多有价值的专利。在控制了董事的平均年龄，无本地商业机构关联的董事比例和政府有效性之后，这些结论仍然成立。
关键词：董事会独立性，腐败，关联公司，创新
Board Independence,Corruption and Innovation. Some Evidence on UK Subsidiaries
Vania Sena (University of Essex), Meryem Duygun (University of Nottingham), Giuseppe Lubrano (University of Salerno), Marianna Marra (University of Essex), Mohamed Shaban (University of Sheffield)
ABSTRACT
In this paper we test the hypothesis that independent boards can insulate a company from the detrimental impact of corruption on its performance (proxied by innovation). To this purpose, we have estimated an innovation production function that links innovation outputs to innovation input (namely investment in R&D) on a sample of manufacturing subsidiaries controlled by British multinationals and located in 30 countries. Our analysis covers the period 2005–2013. After controlling for the subsidiary's characteristics (including the ownership structure and whether the main shareholders are from Common Law countries), we find that independent boards may mitigate the negative impact of corruption on innovation as subsidiaries located in more corrupt countries and with more independent boards tend to invest more in R&D and register more valuable patents. These results still hold after controlling for the average age of the directors, the proportion of directors with no local business affiliations and government effectiveness.
Keywords: Board Independence, Corruption, Affiliates, Innovation
原文链接：
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911991730617X#!
翻译：王秭越
